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Abstract 
The modifier effect is the reduction in perceived likelihood of a generic property sentence, 
when the head noun is modified. We investigated the prediction that the modifier effect 
would be stronger for mutable than for central properties, without finding evidence for this 
predicted interaction over the course of five experiments. However Experiment 6, which 
provided a brief context for the modified concepts to lend them greater credibility, did reveal 
the predicted interaction. It is argued that the modifier effect arises primarily from a general 
lack of confidence in generic statements about the typical properties of unfamiliar concepts. 
Neither prototype nor classical models of concept combination receive support from the 
phenomenon.
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The modifier effect is a phenomenon reported by Connolly, Fodor, Gleitman and Gleitman 
(2007) in which the truth of a generic statement is considered less likely when the subject 
noun is preceded by an atypical modifier. In their study, a bare plural generic statement such 
as “ravens are black” was rated as increasingly less likely to be true when the subject noun 
“ravens” was qualified by a typical modifier (“feathered ravens are black”), an atypical 
modifier (“jungle ravens are black”), or two atypical modifiers (“young jungle ravens are 
black”). This effect has proven to be highly robust (Jönsson & Hampton 2006; 2011), and is 
of considerable potential theoretical interest. For example, Connolly et al. used the effect to 
argue against prototype theories of concept modification, which, they suggested, should 
predict that common properties of a concept are inherited with unaffected strength when the 
concept is modified. 
The purpose of this article is not directly to take issue with Connolly et al.’s 
interpretation of the effect, which we have done elsewhere (see Jönsson & Hampton, 2006; 
2008; 2011; Jönsson, 2008; Hampton & Jönsson, 2011, for our position on the theoretical 
issues involved, and empirical explorations of the effect.) Rather, the article presents a new 
empirical investigation of the phenomenon in order to explore three possible explanations. 
Before presenting the particular research question we addressed, the modifier effect will be 
explained in a little more detail. 
To set the context of this investigation, let us briefly consider what the effect shows. 
Depending on the relative frequencies of the objects involved, there is often only a weak 
constraint between the likelihood that a property is true of a class in general and the 
likelihood that it is true of a subclass. Most ravens may be black, while jungle ravens may be 
green. Unless the subclass is a substantial majority of the class, or the property is true of 
almost all of the class, the two proportions (ravens that are black versus jungle ravens that are 
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black) are free to vary independently. Only in the case of a universally quantified statement 
does a logical constraint appear (“all ravens are black”, and “all jungle ravens are ravens” 
entails that “all jungle ravens are black”). We explored this case of universally quantified 
statements in a previous paper (Jönsson & Hampton, 2006) where we demonstrated a robust 
tendency to fallacious reasoning, in which people’s judgments violated this logical 
constraint. 
Given the lack of any strong constraint for generic sentences, there may nonetheless be 
ways of using world knowledge to predict a difference in likelihoods. A modified concept 
may be more likely to possess a property if the modifier “supports” the property. Thus fresh 
vegetables are more likely to be good for your health than vegetables alone. Fast cars are 
more likely to consume a lot of gasoline than are cars in general. Similarly a modifier may 
contradict a property, as in cases such as “broken clocks tell the time” (see for example 
Springer & Murphy, 1992). The basis of the modifier effect is that one should select 
modifiers with no prima facie connection to the property in question. For instance, in the 
sentence “dry cellars are dark”, although “dry” is an atypical modifier of “cellars”, being dry 
has no direct bearing on the question of whether cellars are dark or not. Connolly et al. 
(2007) based their selection of materials on this principle of independence, and so it is in this 
context that the reduction in judged likelihood is to be understood.1 If, they argued, a 
modified concept inherits the typical properties of the unmodified noun by default, there 
should be no reduction in judged likelihood. The finding of the modifier effect, they 
concluded, is evidence against the default inheritance of prototype properties, and therefore is 
                                                 
1 Connolly et al.’s (2007) original items were examined more closely in the light of this 
principle in Jönsson and Hampton (2011), where people were asked to justify their decisions 
about relative likelihood of the same set of materials. There were very few items that showed 
any systematic deviation from the principle of independence required here. The full set of 
sentences are presented in the Appendix so that the reader can verify this for themselves.  
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also evidence against models that suggest that prototypes combine to form the meaning of 
complex noun phrases. 
Having set the context, we now turn to the main purpose of the paper. In order better to 
understand the modifier effect, the question we address is how the effect interacts with the 
mutability of the asserted predicate, (“are black” in the ravens example above). The notion of 
mutability, as developed by Sloman, Love and Ahn (1998) (see also Sloman & Ahn, 1999), 
is a key variable in theories of conceptual memory. A highly mutable property is one that 
could easily be imagined to be different. “Is black” is a mutable property of a raven, since 
one could easily suppose that ravens were brown rather than black, without any consequent 
changes to their other properties of being birds, scavengers, intelligent, a certain size and so 
forth. By contrast a central property is one that has causal dependencies with other properties 
of the concept. For example, having wings is less mutable and more central for a raven than 
is being black. Since their wings enable them to fly, and it is on account of their flying that 
they can roost in trees, find their food and so forth, if ravens in general had no wings many 
other properties would also have to be different. So having wings is a central property of 
ravens whereas being black is a mutable property. According to causal model theory 
(Sloman, 2005), mutability/centrality is a consequence of the dependencies that exist 
between the different properties that compose the concept’s schema or prototype. The more 
dependencies that link to a given property, the more central the property will be. The fewer 
dependencies, the more mutable it will be. Mutability is thus a matter of degree. Note that 
mutability is not the same as the prevalence of a property. There may happen to be just as 
many black ravens as there are ravens with wings. It is the links with other properties that 
make a property central rather than mutable. 
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In their paper, Connolly et al. (2007) demonstrated that the modifier effect is moderated 
by the typicality of the modifier. “Young jungle ravens are black” was rated as less likely 
than “Feathered ravens are black”. However no research has yet considered whether the 
effect is also moderated by the centrality versus mutability of the predicate. Would the effect 
of an atypical modifier be greater for a mutable property like “is black” than for a central 
property of ravens such as “has wings”? The answer to this question has the potential to shed 
light on the basis of the modifier effect, (more particularly as Connolly et al. used primarily 
mutable properties of the concepts).  
How should mutability of a property affect the size of the modifier effect? We will 
discuss three accounts. We first consider theories of prototype combination. According to 
psychological models of concept modification (e.g. Hampton, 1987; 1988; Murphy, 1988; 
2002; Smith et al., 1988) modifying a concept such as “raven” to produce the concept “jungle 
raven” involves an operation on its conceptual content. Assuming that “jungle” is taken to 
refer to a habitat, the concept of raven will be modified to include the property [HABITAT = 
jungle]. The models differ in detail, but we can use Smith et al.’s model to represent the 
general case. It has been argued (e.g. by Connolly et al. 2007) that the modifier effect is 
evidence against such models, since according to this model, while the dimension HABITAT 
receives additional weight, other prototypical properties of the concept which are unrelated to 
habitat (such as [COLOR = black]) should remain in the schema unchanged. Jönsson and 
Hampton (2008) pointed to a number of problems with this argument. For example, given 
that habitat now has extra importance, and assuming that importance is a relative measure, 
other properties must then have reduced importance, which would lead to a general modifier 
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effect.2 But, for models like Smith et al. (1988) it is also the case that a central property is 
less likely to suffer a reduced importance than a mutable property. Because of the causal 
dependencies among central properties, the change in a single dimension, such as HABITAT, 
is likely to have little effect on a central property such as “has wings”. The network of 
interlinked properties that form the central part of the concept protects individual central 
properties from radical change. On the other hand mutable properties such as COLOR are 
more likely to be affected by a shift in weight resulting from modification. Since it is easy to 
imagine the color of ravens being other than black, one is more easily tempted to entertain 
the possibility of jungle ravens not being black. Hence confidence in the likelihood of the 
property being true goes down. In sum, prototype models lead naturally to the prediction that 
mutability/centrality will moderate the effect of a modifier.  
Our second account takes its inspiration from Connolly et al.’s own interpretation of 
their result, and its roots in the work of Fodor and Lepore (2002). Connolly et al. propose two 
stages in conceptual combination. The first stage is a classical logical combination of the two 
concepts, and involves no consideration of properties or prototypes. Thus a jungle raven is a 
raven and has some relation to jungles, and that is all. They then propose that in a second 
stage pragmatic and knowledge-based reasoning may be used to derive the probability that a 
jungle raven will have the same properties as other ravens or as other jungle creatures. The 
classical account of conceptual combination is a simple and direct way of preserving the 
principle of Compositionality (Fodor and Lepore, 2002; Machery et al., 2011). This principle 
holds that the meaning of a complex concept should be derived only from the meanings of its 
parts, and their mode of combination. Connolly et al.’s account makes no prediction 
                                                 
2 There is also considerable empirical evidence, backed up by detailed theoretical models, 
that the features of prototypes are not inherited without alteration – see for example Hampton 
(1987; 1997), Murphy (1988), and Medin and Shoben (1988). 
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concerning how the modifier effect should be moderated by mutability, since they give no 
account of how the second phase of a combination might work. Our second theoretical 
account is therefore based simply on the first, classical, phase of their account. If concepts 
are combined classically, then the prototype information associated with each concept 
(including whether a property is central or mutable) will not be inherited by the combined 
concept. In that case, we would predict that both central and mutable properties should 
become less likely to be true in equal measure when the concept is modified. In passing from 
a negative claim (non-inheritance of prototype features) to a positive prediction (reduction in 
likelihood under modification), we follow a simple principle of regression to the mean. As 
unpredictable noise is added to the system during modification, so the tendency will be for 
those properties with higher likelihood at the start to end up with reduced likelihood at the 
end. Thus, while this prediction of non-interaction of mutability with the modifier effect is 
not derivable from Connolly et al. (and should not be attributed to them), we take it to be the 
prediction most in keeping with the notion that modified concepts do not inherit the default 
attributes of their constituent concepts (the inference that they do draw from their results). 
Since mutability is about the conceptual content within a prototype, if the prototype is not 
inherited, then mutability should not interact with the modifier effect. We will term this the 
Non-Inheritance account. 
Our third and final account of the modifier effect is based on more general pragmatic 
considerations. Connolly et al. noted that (perhaps surprisingly) even a typical modifier 
produced a reduction in likelihood for prototypical properties. Thus “feathered ravens are 
black” was considered less likely than “ravens are black”. They suggested that this result 
could reflect the infelicity of the expression. Why would the speaker choose to include the 
typical modifier, if the statement was in any case generally true of the whole class? Estes and 
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Glucksberg (1999) demonstrated a similar effect. Sentences with a prototypical feature and 
an atypical modifier such as “peeled apples are round” were generally slow for people to 
verify relative to more pragmatically relevant sentences such as “peeled apples are white”, 
where the property is true only of the subclass. This difference was reversed when the 
sentence was changed to “even peeled apples are round”, where the pragmatics now favors 
the more general property.   
Evidence for the Pragmatic account comes from a study by Jönsson and Hampton 
(2011, Experiment 2) in which participants first judged whether modified sentences were 
more or less likely to be true than unmodified versions of the same sentence, and were then 
asked to justify their choices. A large proportion of justifications referred to pragmatic issues, 
not just for typical but for atypical modifiers as well. In the case that the modifier works by 
reducing the pragmatic well-formedness of the statements and of the experimental task in 
general, then we would expect to find the effect working equally strongly for mutable and 
central statements. The prediction of the Pragmatic account is thus in line with the Non-
Inheritance account: there should be no interaction between the modifier effect and 
mutability of the predicates. (These two accounts will be further differentiated as the paper 
progresses.) 
The first experiment was a very simple study designed to obtain pairs of properties that 
varied in mutability for a set of concepts, and to test whether more mutable properties were 
considered less likely to be true of the modified concept (e.g. jungle ravens), compared to 
more central properties. The non-inheritance position outlined above would predict that, 
since prototypes of unmodified concepts are not inherited by modified concepts, then 
mutable and central properties should be considered equally unlikely of the modified 
concept. Similarly, the Pragmatic account suggests that the modifier will affect all properties 
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equally as a consequence of introducing general uncertainty about the unfamiliar phrase. On 
the other hand, according to the Prototype Combination account, because of their inherited 
causal dependencies, central properties should be considered more likely to be true than 
mutable properties of the modified concepts. The experiment therefore assessed which of two 
sentences “MN are P1” and “MN are P2” would be considered more likely to be true where 
MN is a modifier + noun phrase and the predicates P1 and P2 differ in terms of mutability for 
the concept N.  
A pretest (Experiment 1a) was used to find pairs of predicates P1 and P2 that differed in 
their relative mutability for the same subject noun N. A variant of Sloman, Love and Ahn’s 
(1998) imagination task was used to measure mutability, and 20 pairs with the clearest 
difference in mutability were selected for further testing.  
Experiment 1a: Pretest 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-three students (undergraduate and graduate students) at City 
University London participated voluntarily for no reward. 
Materials. Materials were adapted from Connolly et al. (2007), who provided a set of 
materials comprising 40 nouns, each with a familiar property and a set of modifiers.   Feature 
norms (Cree & McRae, 2003) were used to find a second property for each of 39 of these 
nouns (one was omitted in error). Since Connolly et al. used broadly mutable properties (e.g. 
ravens are black, sofas are comfortable) the new properties were chosen to be more central. 
Since the task required people to imagine a concept with a missing feature, all properties 
were then expressed in negated form. 
Design and Procedure. The instructions were as follows: 
“On each line below you will see the name of a kind of thing on the left and then two 
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negative statements on the right. We want you to try to imagine an example of the thing 
for which the first statement is true, and then an example of the thing for which the 
second statement is true. Then circle whichever statement was easier to imagine. When 
thinking of the examples, try to assume that the example is just like a normal instance in 
all other respects except for the one denied in the statement. For instance, for the 
combination 
Parka  :     Is not warm    Cannot be used for clothing 
think of a normal parka that is not warm, then think of a normal parka that cannot be used 
for clothing. If you think that it is easier to imagine a parka that is just like a normal parka 
but is not warm than it is to imagine a parka that is just like a normal parka except that it 
cannot be used as clothing, circle “not warm”. Otherwise circle "cannot be used as 
clothing". Remember, circle the negative statement that is easiest to imagine being true, 
and try to think of things that are normal in all other respects except for the one denied in 
the statement.” 
Beneath the instructions the 39 unmodified nouns each appeared together with the two 
negated properties. Order of nouns was randomized, and order of the two properties for each 
noun was balanced between groups. The task took about 10 minutes to complete. 
Results 
Overall, 34 out of the 39 new properties were judged to be less easy to imagine when 
negated than the original properties, in keeping with our intuitions. The 20 pairs with the 
strongest difference between properties were chosen for the subsequent experiment (all 20 of 
the differences were significant on a 1-tailed sign test, α = .05.) The proportion of 
participants who found it easier to imagine the mutable property being changed varied across 
the 20 selected items from .70 to .91, with a mean of .81. The nouns, modifiers and pairs of 
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properties may be seen in Appendix A.  
Experiment 1b: Main test 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four students (undergraduate and graduate students) and members 
of the administrative staff at City University London participated voluntarily. 
Materials. Each booklet consisted of 20 target and 30 filler pairs of sentences, each 
member of a pair having the same atypically modified head noun (atypical modifiers were 
taken from Connolly et al.) and one of two predicates. For instance, for the noun “doves” the 
following pair was created,  
A) Brazilian doves are white.  (mutable) 
B) Brazilian doves have wings.  (central) 
Filler pairs were randomly distributed through the booklet, with 6 fillers at the start to 
avoid warm-up effects. Filler pairs were similar to the targets in both structure and 
likelihood, and provided opportunities to use all 3 possible responses while also disguising 
the nature of the manipulation within the list. 
Design and Procedure. Order of sentences within pairs was balanced across two versions 
of the booklet. Three options appeared to the right of each pair; 1) the first sentence is more 
likely to be true, 2) the second sentence is more likely to be true, and 3) the two sentences are 
equally likely to be true. Participants circled the option they found most appropriate for each 
sentence pair. The task took about 20 minutes. 
Results 
All ANOVAs in this paper were run with items and with participants as random effects. 
The results of the two analyses (F1 and F2) were then combined into a Min F’ statistic (see 
Clark, 1973) which tests for generalizability to both populations. As predicted, property 
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mutability had a strong effect on the judged likelihood of the sentences. The central property 
sentence was selected as being more likely 42% of the time, and the mutable only 14%, with 
the sentences otherwise being judged equally likely. Nineteen out of 20 sentence pairs 
showed the effect. ANOVA confirmed a very significant difference in proportions (Min F’(1, 
35) = 16.2, p < .001). Of the 23 participants, 12 consistently chose the central sentence, 
another 7 judged most of the pairs equally likely, and the remaining 4 divided their responses 
equally between the 3 options.  
Discussion 
As predicted by the prototype combination account, central properties of the unmodified 
prototype were judged more likely to be true of a modified concept than were mutable 
properties. There was therefore evidence that the modified noun concept had inherited the 
causal dependency structure from its parent noun concept, as predicted by prototype 
combination models. However since the experiment did not include a control condition with 
unmodified sentences, the results do not tell us whether the degree to which the modifier is 
having an effect is greater for the mutable sentences. Perhaps the central sentences were 
already more likely to be true, before the modifier was applied. Experiment 2 pursued this 
possibility. 
Experiment 2 
Having established that mutability affects the rated likelihood of properties for modified 
concepts, we next turned to the main research question outlined in the Introduction. In 
Experiment 2 both modified and unmodified versions of the sentences were included in order 
to test whether mutable properties would show a greater modifier effect than central 
properties, as predicted by prototype combination models, or whether there is no interaction 
as predicted by our Non-Inheritance and Pragmatic accounts. 
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Method 
Participants. Thirty-six Masters students at City University London participated 
voluntarily by completing a booklet in a classroom setting. 
Materials. Four more items were added from Experiment 1a to arrive at 24 pairs of 
properties, one central and one mutable, for 24 nouns. Four sentences were then constructed 
for each subject noun by crossing (a) whether the noun was modified with an atypical 
modifier or left unmodified, and (b) whether the property was mutable or central. The 
quadruples were divided into 4 sets of 6 at random, and these sets were rotated across 
conditions across 4 booklets, so that each booklet contained 6 sentences in each condition, 
and each subject noun occurred only once in each booklet. Thirty-two filler sentences, some 
clearly true, others clearly false, and others borderline true, were distributed at random 
through the booklet. About half of the fillers had modified subject nouns. 
Design & Procedure. Two factors were manipulated within-subjects and within-items: 
whether or not the subject noun was modified (with an atypical modifier), and whether the 
property was mutable or central. Sentences were rated on a 10 point likelihood rating scale. 
The following instructions were given, together with examples of a clearly true, a doubtful 
and a clearly false sentence:  
“The following pages contain a list of English sentences. The numbers 1 through 10 
appear to the right of each sentence. We would like you to circle the number to the right 
of each sentence that you feel best captures how likely you think it is that the sentence is 
true. 1 = very unlikely and 10= very likely (the numbers in between represent 
intermediate levels of certainty).” 
The task took about 15 minutes. 
Results 
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Figure 1 shows mean likelihood ratings for each condition. Unmodified sentences (black 
bars) were judged more likely than modified (a difference of 1.5) and central sentences were 
judged more likely than mutable (a difference of 1.2). ANOVA was run with factors of 
Modifier and Mutability. Both main effects were significant (for Modifier, Min F’(1, 50) = 
15.2, p < .001, and for Mutability, Min F’(1, 34) = 9.2, p < .005). There was no evidence of 
an interaction (F1 and F2 both < 1). Contrary to the predictions of prototype combination 
models, but in keeping with our Non-Inheritance and Pragmatic accounts, the size of the 
modifier effect was nearly identical for properties that were central or mutable for the head 
noun concept.  
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 confirmed the finding in Experiment 1 that modified 
concepts were judged more likely to possess properties judged to be central for unmodified 
concepts than those judged to be mutable. However we failed to find any evidence that 
mutability affects the size of the modifier effect, since these central properties were also 
judged more likely for the unmodified concepts, and to just the same extent. The results were 
therefore consistent with the idea that concepts are combined in a classical fashion, and that 
all prototypical properties are subsequently considered less likely for a modified concept, 
regardless of centrality. At the same time the results are consistent with a general pragmatic 
view that proposes that people generally become suspicious of unfamiliar modified concepts. 
One possible way to save the prototype combination account is to suggest that the central 
properties used were not sufficiently central. Or perhaps the imaginability task was not 
picking out the right dimension. Experiment 3 used a new pretest for materials asking 
participants to choose whether properties were necessary, central or mutable, and these data 
were used to select a new set of materials. 
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Experiment 3 was also designed to test a differential prediction of the Pragmatic and 
Non-Inheritance accounts of the effect. To this end we included category properties as 
predicates in the experiment. The idea was that according to the Pragmatic account there is a 
general suspicion aroused by the unfamiliarity of the phrases and oddness of the statements 
and of the rating task. Hence the modifier effect should continue to be found in equal 
measure, regardless of whether the property is mutable, central or categorical. However, on 
the Non-Inheritance view, at least if it is combined with the classical theory of concept 
composition that inspired it, there should be a difference between category properties and 
other properties, since on this view some logical truths do follow. Consider for instance the 
statements “ravens are birds” and “jungle ravens are birds”. According to concept 
composition, one can be confident that jungle ravens are ravens. That is what 
compositionality guarantees (aside from non-compositional idioms such as a nest egg, which 
is not an egg). However if one is certain that jungle ravens are ravens, and equally certain 
that ravens are birds, there should be no reason to doubt that jungle ravens are birds. It should 
certainly be a lot more likely that they are birds than that they are black. A further reason for 
expecting that category predicates would be immune to the modifier effect was that Hampton 
(1987) found evidence that properties considered necessary for a concept should be inherited 
as necessary for a subclass. So even if the Non-Inheritance model predicts no general 
interaction with mutability, it does predict differences between categorical properties and 
other properties. 
It may be argued that according to Fodor’s non-definitional theory of concepts (Fodor, 
2000) the fact that ravens are birds is not a “part” of the concept of RAVEN, which is simply 
an unanalyzed symbol that points to the class of ravens. Yet even with this way of 
individuating conceptual content, a person who holds the belief that “All ravens are birds”, 
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and who understands from compositionality that “All jungle ravens are ravens”, is very likely 
to assent to the statement that all jungle ravens are birds. Thus while a non-definitional 
account of concepts, like Fodor’s, does not give the result directly, the account only needs to 
be minimally enriched with the transitivity of class inclusion to generate the prediction that 
category statements should be less affected by a modifier than mutable properties.  
 
Experiment 3a:  Pre-test 
Experiment 3 was designed to test for the interaction of mutability and modification with 
three kinds of property: mutable properties, a new set of central properties, and categorical 
properties. A pre-test was run asking people to differentiate properties into three levels of 
importance – mutable, central and necessary. Categorical properties (which we expected to 
be judged necessary) were also included in the pre-test, so there were actually four kinds of 
pre-selected sentences for each concept which were then judged according to the three levels 
of importance. For practical reasons, the pre-test was run in Italian at an Italian University. 
Because the materials presented no problems for translation, and included only everyday 
concepts familiar in both cultures, it was assumed that the judgments would be valid for the 
consequent main experiment which was conducted in London. The ratings in the main 
experiment to be reported below confirmed this assumption. 
Method 
Participants. 46 students at Facoltà di Scienze della Formazione, Catania participated 
voluntarily for no reward. 
Materials. 40 nouns were used based in part on the previous materials, and four 
properties were generated for each noun, which we deemed in advance to be mutable, 
central, necessary and categorical for the noun. Materials and instructions were in Italian, but 
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English translations are given here. 
Procedure. Each participant received instructions followed by a list of nouns each with 4 
properties to judge. The instructions were as follows: 
“In this booklet you will find concepts on the left (in bold) each of which have four 
property statements next to them. We want you to decide whether each statement is 
necessary, central or mutable for the relative concept on the left. For each statement 
please choose one option (necessary, central, or mutable) that you think is most 
appropriate, by ticking the box on the right”.  
Items were displayed thus: 
crocodiles  a) have big jaws   Necessary □  /  Central □  /   Mutable □ 
   b) have at least one lung  Necessary □  /  Central □  /   Mutable □ 
   c) are reptiles    Necessary □  /  Central □  /   Mutable □ 
   d) are dangerous   Necessary □  /  Central □  /   Mutable □ 
Instructions included definitions of Necessary, Central and Mutable as follows, (with 
examples): 
“A property of a concept is mutable if it can change without having any effect on other 
characteristics describing that concept.….  
A property of a given concept is central when, in some way, it causes or explains another 
characteristic of the same concept…  
A property of a given concept is necessary if it is always true….. 
The order of nouns was randomized, and the order of the four properties for each noun 
was balanced. The task took about 10 minutes. 
Results 
Responses were scored using a three-point scale of Mutability (1=necessary, 2=central, 
Hampton et al.: Modifiers and Mutability. 
19 
3=mutable). Overall, the statements with categorical properties were chosen as least mutable 
followed by the necessary, central and mutable ones (means on the scale from 1 to 3 were 
respectively 1.34, 1.72, 1.89 and 2.46). The 7 quadruples with the least differentiation 
between properties were discarded, leaving 33 sets. Since the preselected central and 
necessary properties were not well differentiated, showing considerable overlap, the 4 
sentences for each concept were reduced to 3 by selecting either the central or the necessary 
property (whichever was closest to half way between the categorical and the mutable 
sentences).  There were therefore 3 levels of mutability in the experiment: “mutable”, 
“central”, and “category”, with mean mutability ratings (and standard deviations) of 2.46 
(.28), 1.84 (.25) and 1.34 (.21) respectively. 
Experiment 3b: Main Study 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-two undergraduate students at City University London participated 
voluntarily. 
Materials. Six sentences for each noun concept were constructed depending on whether 
the noun was modified or not, and on whether the property was mutable, central or 
categorical. Each booklet contained 11 sentences for each level of mutability, with materials 
rotated across the 3 levels of mutability across 3 booklets. Presence or absence of the atypical 
modifier was manipulated between-subjects, so each booklet with unmodified head nouns 
was matched by a second booklet in which the head nouns were all modified. Each subject 
noun occurred only once in each booklet. Target sentences were randomly embedded in 33 
filler sentences, some clearly true, others clearly false, and others borderline true. About half 
of the fillers had modified subject nouns. Target sentences can be found in Appendix B. 
Design. Two factors were manipulated, Mutability within-subjects with 3 levels, and 
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Modification between-subjects. Both factors were within-items.  
Procedure. Each participant completed a booklet in a classroom setting. Sentences were 
rated on a 10-point likelihood rating scale as in Experiment 2. The task took about 15 
minutes. 
Results 
Mean likelihood ratings are shown in Figure 2. Unmodified sentences were judged more 
likely than modified, and category sentences were judged more likely than central sentences, 
which in turn were judged more likely than mutable. ANOVA was run with factors of 
Modifier (present or absent) and Mutability of the property. Both main effects were 
significant (for Modifier, Min F’(1, 70) = 34.4, p < .001, and for Mutability, Min F’(2, 140) = 
38.9, p < .005). There was no evidence of an interaction (F1 and F2 both < 1). Again contrary 
to expectations, the size of the modifier effect was the same at each of the three levels of 
centrality for the unmodified concept. Remarkably, even category membership statements 
(pigeons are birds) were considered less likely when the subject noun was modified (solitary 
pigeons are birds).  
A number of additional analyses were undertaken to explore the data. Examination of 
individual items revealed no obvious bad items or other trends discernible that could have 
been responsible for masking an interaction. Furthermore, fillers were reliably answered – for 
example the clearly true filler statements had mean ratings of around 9 out of 10. We tried 
dichotomizing the data by treating ratings of 1-5 as False, and 6-10 as True, but likelihood of 
a True rating defined in this way showed exactly the same pattern of results and lack of 
interaction as before. 
A power calculation was made for a planned contrast between the modified and 
unmodified conditions for the size of the difference between ratings for category and mutable 
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properties. The observed difference in the effect was only 0.12. Power was estimated to be 
over 90% to detect a difference in the size of effect of as much as 0.75 on the 10 point scale. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3b again provided no evidence that mutability affects the size 
of the modifier effect, even when properties with carefully pretested levels of mutability were 
used. Remarkably, statements about category membership were reduced in likelihood in just 
the same way as other properties. The fact that category statements were also affected by the 
modifiers suggests that neither the Prototype Combination nor the Non-Inheritance accounts 
of the effect are correct, and that in fact the modifier effect reflects some quite general 
consequence of the pragmatics of the experimental task, leading to reduced confidence in all 
sentences relating to modified concepts. 
Before accepting this conclusion, our next experiment considered whether the lack of an 
interaction could be explained by the type of rating that was used. Perhaps rating the 
“likelihood” of something being true on a 10 point scale invites people to signal the 
unfamiliarity of the modified head noun phrase by giving a lower rating, even when they 
believe the statements to be actually true. In Experiment 4 we therefore tried a different, 
more qualitative response scale. 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 used an ordinal response scale with just 4 possible responses labeled: 
“necessary, important, replaceable, not true”, instead of the 1-10 numerical rating.  The aim 
was to discourage a mapping of familiarity on to the rating scale, and to encourage 
participants to consider the actual truth of the statements. We expected that a statement that 
was considered “necessary” for an unmodified head noun should continue to be necessary for 
its modified form (Hampton, 1987), whereas other properties may shift down the scale when 
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the subject noun is modified. In order to reduce the overall sense of otherworldliness about 
the list, we also chose filler sentences so that 50% of them used typical modifiers, as in 
Connolly et al.’s original study. 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-two undergraduate students at City University, London participated 
for reward by completing a booklet in a classroom setting. 
Materials. We used the same materials as in Experiment 3b changing only the fillers and 
response scale as described above.  
Design. The design was the same as in Experiment 3b, with modification between-
subjects and type of property (category, central and mutable) within-subjects. 
Procedure. Each booklet contained instructions and 3 pages of sentences. Next to each 
sentence was a choice of 4 responses, necessary, important, replaceable, and not true. A 
participant had simply to circle whichever of the four they felt best applied to the sentence. 
For example if they believed it to be necessary that pigeons are birds, they should circle the 
“necessary” response. Instructions explained the meaning of the four terms, using examples 
as in Experiment 3a. The task took about 15 minutes. 
Results 
Although the response scale was only ordinal, for a simple test of the interaction, and to 
compare the results with the previous experiment, the responses were mapped to a 1-4 
numerical scale and averaged. Results are shown in Figure 3. Once again unmodified 
sentences received responses further up the scale of necessity/truth than modified ones, and 
the ordering of type of sentences of category, central and mutable was again seen. Both main 
effects were significant (for Modifier, Min F’(1, 70) = 35.9, p < .001, and for Mutability, Min 
F’(2, 140) = 148.0, p < .005), but again there was no interaction between the two factors. 
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Analysing the data by frequency of responses led to the same conclusion. For example, 
category statements about unmodified concepts were considered necessary 63% of the time, 
but the same statements about modified concepts were judged necessary only 47% of the 
time. Similarly, unmodified statements were judged “not true” 3% of the time, but this rose 
to 12% for modified statements. The lack of interaction in Experiment 3 was therefore not 
solely attributable to the response scale used. 
Discussion 
At this point, three studies have failed to show any influence of mutability on the 
modifier effect. People were as likely to downgrade the likelihood of a category membership 
statement (roosters/stupid roosters are birds) as they were the likelihood of a central property 
(roosters/stupid roosters have wings) or a mutable property (roosters/stupid roosters crow at 
dawn). These results suggest that the source of the modifier effect is unlikely to be found in 
the semantic interaction of modifier and head noun, and is more likely to reflect an overall 
non-specific bias in confidence for any sentence with an atypically modified head noun. 
In Experiment 5 we searched for the elusive interaction by giving the same participants 
both modified and unmodified versions of the same sentence. In the studies reported so far, a 
participant only saw one or the other version of each sentence. The use of rating scales can be 
anchored differently when the surrounding context changes, and although we always used at 
least 50% filler sentences that were identical in each booklet, our participants were never 
confronted with the contrast between modified and unmodified versions of the same sentence 
within the same booklet. Suppose that in the first half of a booklet, you judge that “roosters 
are birds” is very likely to be true. When faced with “stupid roosters are birds” later on in the 
booklet, you may now consider that the statement is still just as likely. On the other hand a 
mutable property for “stupid roosters” such as “crow at dawn” may show less influence of 
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having seen the earlier unmodified sentence, so that the long-awaited interaction may now 
appear. To reduce the length of the booklet, we dropped the middle level of “central” 
properties, and just compared mutable with category properties in a 2x2 design. 
Experiment 5 
Method. 
Participants. Thirty-two participants took part as unpaid volunteers. They were recruited 
from the residents of a student accommodation facility in London, and all had fluent English. 
Materials. Thirty-two head nouns and atypical modifiers were selected based on 
previously used materials, together with a category and a mutable property for each.  Four 
booklets were constructed, each notionally divided into four quarters. In the first quarter were 
16 target sentences, four in each condition. These same 16 targets were then repeated in the 
third quarter of the booklet, but with the modifier condition changed. Thus the 8 sentences 
presented as unmodified in the first quarter were presented as modified in the third quarter, 
and those that were modified were presented in the third quarter as unmodified. The same 
procedure was applied to the second and fourth quarters of the booklets. A further 32 filler 
sentences were randomly interspersed throughout the booklet, (8 in each quarter), so that 
there was always a minimum lag of 32 sentences between the two different versions 
(modified and unmodified) of the same sentence. As in previous experiments, the fillers were 
a mix of modified and unmodified sentences some true and some false. 
Design and Procedure. The design was 2x2 within-subjects and within-items. Materials 
were divided into four sets which were then rotated across the four conditions across four 
booklets. Ratings were collected as in Experiment 2. 
Results. 
Figure 4 shows the results. The left panel shows the mean ratings for those sentence pairs 
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which appeared in the booklet with the modified version first. Thus for example, people first 
rated “stupid roosters are birds/crow at dawn” and then later on “roosters are birds/crow at 
dawn”. In this order of presentation, the previous results were replicated. There were 
significant main effects of modifier and of centrality, and no hint of an interaction. The right 
hand panel shows the same results but for the other order – where the unmodified sentence 
was rated first, followed by the modified version. Here a much reduced effect of the modifier 
can be seen. Comparing the two panels, unmodified sentences represented by the black filled 
bars were unaffected by being presented first or second, with mean ratings of around 9 for 
category and 7.77 for mutable properties. On the other hand modified sentences were rated 
more highly when presented second (M = 8.56, 7.19) than when presented first (M = 7.73, 
6.13).  
Three-way ANOVA with within-subjects factors of order, modifier and mutability 
confirmed this interpretation of the results. There were main effects of order (Min F’ (1, 61) 
= 9.8, p < .005), mutability (Min F’ (1, 62) = 28.4, p < .001), and modifier (Min F’ (1, 61) = 
26.7, p < .001), and a significant interaction of modifier and order (Min F’ (1, 59) = 5.16, p = 
.027). No other interactions were significant (Min F’ < 1). The breakdown of the interaction 
by order showed that although the modifier effect was stronger in one order than the other, 
there was still a significant modifier effect for each order (Modified-Unmodified, Min F’ (1, 
57) = 30.54, p < .001, and Unmodified-Modified, Min F’ (1, 61) = 5.01, p < .05). Notably 
however there was no evidence at all for any interaction between the mutability and modifier 
factors in either order. (The same was true if the first and second halves of the booklet were 
analyzed separately.) 
Discussion. 
The search for conditions under which the modifier effect would show an interaction with 
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mutability failed once again in Experiment 5. We had supposed that if exposed to both 
modified and unmodified versions of the same sentence, people would become aware of the 
contrast involved, and that this might trigger the kind of semantic considerations that could 
give rise to the interaction. On the other hand, the manipulation we used did have an 
interesting effect. When the modified sentence was presented after the unmodified version, 
then the modifier effect was significantly reduced (from 1.43 to 0.53). Modified sentences 
were rated as more likely when they were in the second half of the booklet. We are led to 
conclude even more strongly that the modifier effect is probably driven not by the semantics 
of the task, but by some other pragmatic consideration involving the unfamiliarity or oddness 
of the head noun phrases. Having established that (say) roosters are part of the common 
discourse, then the phrase stupid roosters is more likely to indicate a proper subset of 
roosters, and hence the subset’s properties (both categorical and mutable) are more likely to 
be considered the same as its parent class. 
To test this account, our final study attempted to manipulate the pragmatics of the rating 
task more directly, by asking participants in one condition to read a short piece of text (a 
“wiki”) about each modified noun phrase before doing the ratings. Attention to the text was 
ensured by having a short memory test at the end of the procedure. The aim of the text was to 
establish that the subset named by the modifier-noun combination was a bona fide class, with 
the words being used in a literal sense. Thus each text introduced the modified concept in a 
context that made it clear that it was of the same kind as the unmodified concept. In addition, 
directing attention to the later memory test reduced the pragmatic burden on the ratings 
themselves, so that the trivial truth and falsehood of many of the sentences should be 
recognized in an unproblematic way. 
Experiment 6 
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Method 
Participants. Eighty students at City University London participated in the experiment, 
20 randomly allocated to each condition. 
Materials. Booklets were constructed based on 16 concepts, each with an atypical 
modifier and two critical properties, one categorical and one mutable. In addition two filler 
properties were created for each concept, one possibly true (e.g. pigeons are grey) and one 
most probably false (pigeons can smile). The booklets were laid out with an instruction cover 
sheet, followed by all four properties listed for each of the concepts in turn. The four 
sentences were in a new random order for each concept. For example: 
 pigeons are birds         
 pigeons are grey         
 pigeons live in parks         
 pigeons can smile         
Half of the concepts in each booklet were unmodified, as in the example here, and half 
were modified (e.g. Tibetan pigeons are birds). Modified versus unmodified sentences were 
rotated across booklets, so that half the participants judged the modified version and half 
judged the unmodified version for each concept. The same order of the 16 concepts was used 
in each booklet. The second factor was the presentation of a wiki-context. These contexts 
were obtained from Google searches of the web. Half the booklets provided a brief context 
for each concept, and half had no context. For example, for pigeons, the following text 
appeared before the list of four sentences: 
Tibetan pigeons mate for life and rear their broods together, although if one dies the 
other will take a new mate. Once the simple nest is built, the female lays an egg and 
then another a day or so later. Once the eggs hatch, both parents feed the young 
squabs. 
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The context did not provide a direct answer to the truth of any of the four sentences, but 
established that the modified concept was non-idiomatic. The same context was provided for 
both modified and unmodified versions of the concepts. Thus, across 4 booklets, each 
concept appeared in 4 sentences, one unmodified without context, one unmodified but with a 
context, one modified without context, and one modified with a context. Further examples of 
context passages are to be found in Appendix C. 
Design and procedure. Three factors were manipulated in the design. The provision of a 
context was a between-participants factor. Provision of context was deliberately confounded 
with telling participants to expect a memory test for the context material, in order to 
encourage them to read it carefully. Modification of the concepts was a within-participants 
within-items factor. Finally, two types of property were used, category and mutable. This 
sentence factor was within participants and within items. In addition each concept was paired 
with two filler sentences as described above.  
For the No Context condition, the coversheet contained the following instructions: 
“The following pages contain 16 groups of sentences. Each group contains 4 
sentences. The numbers 1 through 10 appear to the right of each sentence. We would 
like you to circle the number to the right of each sentence that you feel best captures 
how likely you think it is that the sentence is true. 1 = very unlikely and 10= very 
likely (the numbers in between represent intermediate levels of certainty).” 
Examples were given of a set of sentences concerning Paris with a clearly true statement, 
two possibly true statements and a false statement, and the circling of numbers was 
illustrated. The instructions on the cover sheet for the Context condition were adapted from 
these as follows: 
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“The following pages contain 16 groups of sentences, each of them preceded by a 
piece of information taken from “wikipedia” or some newspaper. The numbers 1 
through 10 appear …” 
Following the illustrations of true and false sentences about Paris, the instructions 
continued: 
“After this task we will test your memory about the information that appeared before 
each group of sentences. We want you to say if they are true or false. For instance, 
with the sentence “Paris is one of the world's leading business centers”, if you read 
the information in the previous exercise, you should circle TRUE”  
Results 
Performance in the memory test was satisfactory, showing good attention was paid to the 
text. Likelihood ratings were averaged across participants and items for each condition. 
Twenty-two missing data points (<1%) were replaced by the mean across participants for that 
item and condition. Means are displayed in Figure 5. The left panel of the figure shows that 
without a context there was a somewhat greater modifier effect for Mutable (M = 0.9) than 
for Category (M = 0.6) sentences. The right panel shows the results of adding in a context 
and memory test. The interaction between mutability and the modifier was enhanced, with 
modifier effects of 0.8 for mutable and only 0.2 for category sentences. 
A 3-way ANOVA was conducted on the data with factors of Modifier (present or absent), 
Mutability (mutable vs category sentences) and Context (Context provided or absent). There 
were significant main effects of Modifier (Min F’(1,35) = 13.3, p < .001) and Mutability 
(Min F’(1,19) = 10.8, p < .005), and significant two-way interactions between Mutability and 
Context (Min F’(1,43) = 4.3, p < .05), and between Mutability and Modifier (Min F’(1,64) = 
4.53, p < .05). No other effects approached significance (F < 1).  
The two significant two-way interactions may be understood as follows. The interaction 
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of Mutability with Context reflects the fact that in the Context condition, the plausibility of 
the Category statements (regardless of modification) increased (from 8.54 to 8.80), while the 
plausibility of the Mutable statements decreased (from 7.79 to 7.36). (Neither shift was 
significant alone on a t-test). Thus provision of a context increased the difference in 
likelihood between Category and Mutable properties. The second interaction, that of 
Mutability with Modifier, is the effect that failed to emerge in any of the previous 
experiments. The modifier effect was less overall for the Category statements (mean 0.4) 
than for the Mutable statements (mean 0.9). 
Was it the provision of the context that led to the emergence of the interaction between 
the modifier effect and mutability? Although the three-way interaction was not significant, it 
was found that when analyzed separately, the interaction in question was significant in the 
Context condition (F1(1,78) = 7.8, p < .01, F2(1,15) = 6.6, p < .05), but not in the No-Context 
condition (p > .2 in each analysis). In fact the interaction was twice as great in the Context 
condition. Similarly, when planned comparisons were used to identify the presence of 
modifier effects in each condition, they were found to be present in both category and 
mutable statements in the No Context condition (t (39) > 3.0, p < .01 for both subjects and 
items analyses), but only present in the mutable statements in the Context condition (t (39) 
>3.0, p < .01 for subjects and items for mutable statements, t1(39) = 1. 36, t2(15) = 0.64, for 
category statements). 
A final check was made to test whether the interaction of modifier and mutability 
observed in the Context condition could be owing to a ceiling effect. Perhaps the modified 
category rating (8.71) in that condition was already too close to ceiling for the unmodified 
category rating (8.90) to go any higher. To rule out a ceiling effect, a median split was 
applied to the average of the modified and unmodified category statement ratings for the 16 
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sentences in the Context condition. The analysis was re-run separately for the 8 higher rated 
sentences, and the 8 lower rated sentences. If a ceiling effect was generating the interaction, 
then the modifier effect should be seen for the lower rated sentences, but not for the higher, 
which would be constrained by the ceiling. For the higher rated category sentences 
unmodified sentences were rated at 9.75 versus 9.20 for the modified, giving a modifier 
effect of +0.55. For the lower rated category sentences mean ratings were 8.04 (unmodified) 
vs 8.22 (modified). So in fact the modifier effect (-0.18) was completely absent for the lower 
rated sentences where the effect should have been stronger according to the ceiling effect 
hypothesis. The interaction of Mutability with Modifier was still significant for the lower 
rated sentences on the items ANOVA (F(1,7) = 5.84, p < .05), but not for the higher rated 
sentences (where the ceiling effect would have generated an interaction). There was therefore 
no evidence that a ceiling effect was responsible for the interaction in the Context condition.   
Unfortunately the power of the study was insufficient to obtain the significant three-way 
interaction that would have most clearly demonstrated the influence of the context on the 
interaction of mutability and modifiers. (A problem exacerbated by a non-significant 
interaction in the same direction seen in the No Context condition). However the pattern of 
the results, coupled with the repeated failure to find the interaction in previous studies in this 
series, strongly suggest that the provision of a context (and memory test) was the decisive 
factor. 
Discussion 
After a long series of experiments, we were finally able to demonstrate a significant 
interaction in which the modifier effect was seen in mutable statements but not in category 
statements. Although the 3-way interaction was not significant, there was clear evidence that 
this interaction was present in the context condition, while in the No context condition the 
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effect was not significant. Similarly, planned t-tests showed that the modifier effect was no 
longer significant for category membership statements when a context was provided. It is 
therefore reasonable to conclude that it was the provision of the context (and other changes in 
procedure introduced in this condition) that led to the elimination of a modifier effect 
specifically for category membership statements. 
The overall effect of providing a context in the form of a short wiki was to increase 
confidence in the category membership of the concepts, while at the same time decreasing 
confidence in possession of the mutable properties. It is therefore plausible to conclude that a 
major component in the modifier effect when no context is provided is simply suspicion 
about the compositionality of the modified noun phrase. If people question whether a jungle 
raven is a bird, then they must logically also question whether it is a raven. Given the wiki 
context that establishes the existence and nature of the modified concepts as being the right 
kind of thing, then suspicions about category membership disappear. On the other hand 
people are consequently less certain about whether the mutable property should now apply.  
Experiment 6 introduced a number of procedural changes, each of which may have 
played a role in obtaining the Modifier x Mutability interaction. In addition to providing a 
context, we also listed four sentences together for each concept, and provided a memory test 
as an explanation of the aims of the experiment. Further research may tease apart which of 
these was the most critical factor. Our aim here was simply to establish the existence of a 
procedure in which the elusive interaction could be made to appear. In that aim, the 
experiment was successful. 
It may be considered that providing participants with a snippet of knowledge will 
naturally bias them into giving the desired result. However it should be noted that the wiki 
texts never mentioned the properties being rated, their sole function being to establish that 
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the subclass named by the modified noun phrase was in the right general domain, so that 
there was no reason to suspect an idiomatic or figurative use of language. By showing that in 
this instance the modifier effect does after all affect mutable properties more than categorical 
ones provides a much needed boundary condition to contrast with the failure to find the 
interaction in the previous experiments. Whether the effect can still be obtained with more 
subtle or less direct textual contexts is a question for future research. 
General Discussion 
Our research began with a desire to understand the modifier effect. Why is it that people 
rate the likelihood of generic sentences as lower when an atypical modifier is applied to the 
subject? Three possible answers were considered. One was to consider that concepts combine 
classically and, additionally, that prototypical features are not inherited directly by the 
modified concepts. When two concepts are combined, as when an adjective modifies a noun, 
rules of compositionality require that the resulting complex concept is composed just of the 
meanings of the two component concepts and their mode of combination. Hence a BROWN 
COW is just brown and a cow. Once the concept of BROWN COW has been formed 
compositionally, one has to look once more into the world and discover the prototypical 
properties of this new set, which may or may not show inheritance of the prototypes of the 
individual concepts. This was our Non-Inheritance account.  
A second explanation was that the effect was the result of processes of prototype 
combination as outlined in models such as Hampton (1987, 1988) or Smith et al. (1988). 
When a concept is modified, according to this approach, the prototype information of each 
concept is integrated into a novel representation or composite prototype. There is a change in 
the set of property information stored with that concept in memory, leading to a shift in the 
weights associated with any particular property and consequently with its judged likelihood. 
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In more complex conceptual combinations, the process can lead to both the loss of some 
attributes and the emergence of new attributes (Hampton, 1987; Medin & Shoben, 1988), but 
in the case of the simple independent modifiers used here, the inheritance of features could 
be expected to be fairly direct.  
It was argued that these two accounts differ in their predictions about how central and 
mutable properties would respond to the modifier effect. While the Non-Inheritance account 
would be consistent with the finding that both properties should suffer an equal reduction in 
likelihood, the prototype combination view predicts a greater effect for mutable properties. 
Round 1 went to the Non-Inheritance account, when Experiment 2 showed equivalent 
modifier effects for the two kinds of properties. 
Both of these accounts however would predict that categorical properties of a concept 
should be less likely to show a modifier effect. The Non-Inheritance account would have it 
that one knows for certain that a brown cow is brown and that it is a cow. Hence anything 
that follows with equal certainty should be equally unaffected by the modification. People 
know that cows are mammals. That is not part of the prototype of cow, in the sense that a 
prototypical property is a defeasible property which contributes to differences in typicality 
within the class. So people should judge “cows are mammals” and “brown cows are 
mammals” as equally likely, whereas “cows go moo”, and “brown cows go moo” should 
differ in likelihood. 
Neither of these accounts can therefore explain the results of Experiments 3 to 5 in which 
it was found that in every case the effect of a modifier was to reduce the likelihood of 
category and mutable properties in equal measure. We therefore need to turn to a third 
possible explanation of the effect, namely pragmatics. Connolly et al. (2007) themselves 
noted that pragmatics was the most likely explanation for why even a typical modifier can 
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produce the effect. In their study, sentences like “quacking ducks can swim” were considered 
less likely than the unmodified “ducks can swim”. To explain the modifier effect for atypical 
modifiers however they appealed to “a further set of pragmatic-inferential processes that 
draw on general knowledge of the world”, without providing a convincing account of why 
the effect should work in the direction of reducing likelihood across the board, or why the 
effect should increase with atypicality.3 If these processes are largely knowledge dependent 
and unpredictable, then there should be no systematic relation between the properties of 
unmodified and modified concepts. 
Hampton et al. (2009; see also Jönsson & Hampton, 2011) showed that when asked to 
account for their judgments, people did in fact frequently refer to pragmatic factors. There is 
something odd or ill-formed about sentences that state general truths about more specific 
subsets (see also Estes & Glucksberg, 1999; Springer & Murphy, 1992). In the present 
experiments, a pragmatic explanation would point to the unfamiliarity of the atypically 
modified concepts. Jungle ravens and albino crocodiles are not familiar categories. People’s 
response is apparently to treat them with a cautious (if not healthy) suspicion. Not only do 
they doubt whether albino crocodiles have tails and four legs, they are also inclined (to an 
equal extent) to doubt whether they are reptiles at all. There is no other explanation for the 
fact that category statements were just as strongly affected by modifiers as were mutable 
statements.  
As evidence for this pragmatic account, we can emphasize two particular results. In 
Experiment 5 people saw both modified and unmodified versions of the same sentence. In 
this case, it was apparent that the second time around, they were more confident in the status 
                                                 
3 In their discussion, Connolly et al. make the argument that people’s knowledge of language 
and its use would guide them to assume that modified concepts will differ from unmodified 
concepts in relevant ways. They suggest that Default to Prototype is a poor bet to make. We 
have made an argument to the contrary in Jönsson and Hampton (2008). 
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of the modified concepts. That is to say that both category and mutable properties were now 
rated more highly for the modified concepts, although still slightly below the ratings for 
unmodified concepts. It can be argued that having first made a judgment about an 
unmodified concept (ravens or crocodiles) participants became more willing to accept the 
modified concepts as being subsets of these concepts. The unmodified concepts established 
the domain within which the modification could be seen to lie. The second result that points 
to a pragmatic account was the effect of the manipulation introduced in Experiment 6. Here 
we provided half of the participants with a short wiki extract in which the subtypes were 
referred to as being the right kind of thing to belong in the conceptual class. (We also 
distracted attention from the judgments by including a recall test for the wiki information). 
The principle effect of this manipulation was to increase confidence in the category 
membership of the modified concepts, while decreasing confidence in the mutable properties. 
Having set people’s suspicions about the modified concepts to rest, the semantic effects that 
had been predicted from the start were finally evident. As both the Non-Inheritance and 
Prototype Combination accounts would predict, the category membership of a concept was 
not significantly affected by the presence of the modifier, whereas the mutable prototypical 
property was significantly reduced in likelihood, which lends some support to the prototype 
account which incorporates the dependency relations between features that determine 
mutability,. 
There are other results in the literature where people’s beliefs in category membership 
have been shaken. In a study using universal quantifiers, Sloman (1998) showed that people 
do not fully accept that “all iron is pentavalent” should follow necessarily from the statement 
“all metals are pentavalent”. Similarly Jönsson and Hampton (2006) found that the modifier 
effect can be found with universally quantified sentences. People considered that “all sofas 
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have backrests” was more likely to be true than that “all uncomfortable handmade sofas have 
backrests”. These results suggest that people do not consider statements of class inclusion 
between concepts to be analytically true. In an early demonstration of this effect, Hampton 
(1982) found that people would happily endorse a sentence such as “a chair is a kind of 
furniture”, while at the same time considering that carseats or skilifts were chairs but were 
not furniture.  More recently, Calvillo and Revlin (2005) showed that even for relatively clear 
categorical bare generic statements (e.g. iron is a metal) there was significant variation across 
items in the degree to which people felt certain about their truth, and that this variation 
predicted judgments of argument strength in Sloman’s (1998) deductive categorical inference 
task. The difference between these earlier results and those reported here is that they largely 
involved universally quantified statements, which thus invoke deductive reasoning rather 
than the more inductive style of reasoning involved in our studies.  
In conclusion, our studies have served to establish that the modifier effect has multiple 
causes. A primary cause of the effect lies in the pragmatics of the task, and only once the fact 
is established that the modified concepts do in fact exist and are not strange idiomatic 
misnomers, can its semantic basis be investigated. It would appear from our final experiment 
that given the right pragmatic context, categorical statements are not affected by a modifier, 
whereas mutable statements are. Further tests of the modifier effect should therefore be 
careful to explore it within a supportive pragmatic context. 
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A) Materials (N = 20) selected for use in Experiment 1b.. 
 
MODIFIER NOUN MUTABLE PROPERTY CENTRAL PROPERTY 
speckled catfish have whiskers can breathe underwater 
dry cellars are dark are found in basements. 
Brazilian doves are white have wings 
male hamsters  live in cages need to drink water to survive 
inexpensive limousines are long have wheels. 
blue napkins are made of paper can be used for wiping one's mouth 
bitter nectarines are juicy grow on trees 
acrylic parkas are warm can be used as clothing 
solitary penguins live in cold climates have feet 
Tibetan pigeons live in parks have wings 
furry pigs live on farms have legs 
jungle ravens  are black have wings 
handmade saxophones are made of brass require air to produce sound 
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baked seaweed is green grows in water 
itchy shirts have buttons can be worn on torso  
uncomfortable sofas are found in living rooms are used for sitting on. 
domestic storks have long legs need to eat to survive 
painted thimbles are made of metal can be worn on one's fingers 
futuristic wagons are used by pulling them have wheels 
Namibian zebras are fast have four legs 
 
 
B) Materials (N = 33) used for Experiments 3b and 4. Expts 5 and 6 used subsets of these materials, with very minor modifications. 
 
MODIFIER NOUN MUTABLE PROPERTY CENTRAL PROPERTY CATEGORY 
dangerous caterpillars have many legs crawl to move around are insects 
striped catfish have whiskers contain bones are fish 
heavy coins are round can be used for buying things are money 
albino crocodiles are dangerous have at least one lung are reptiles 
flightless doves are white have a beak are birds 
imported dresses can be elegant are made of fabric are clothing 
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native american gloves are made of wool have fingers are clothing 
Scandinavian guitars are made of wood can be played are musical instruments 
hairless hamsters live in cages are kept as pets are rodents 
miniature kettles can be made of plastic can hold water are kitchenware 
inedible lambs are white are warm blooded are mammals 
Mongolian limousines are expensive are long are vehicles 
vine-grown nectarines are sweet have stones are fruit 
hunting parkas are warm are man-made are clothing 
oval shaped pearls are white are smooth are jewels 
solitary pigeons live in parks need to eat to survive are birds 
long-haired pigs live on farms are omnivorous are mammals 
gas-powered refrigerators are used for storing food are less cold than a freezer are kitchen appliances 
homegrown rhubarb is used for pies grows in the ground is a plant 
antique rifles are dangerous shoot bullets are weapons 
unintelligent roosters crow at dawn have a heart are birds 
old saxophones are made of brass can be used to play music are musical instruments 
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ceremonial scarves are made of wool are flexible are clothing 
Baltic seaweed is green grows in sea water is a plant 
opulent shacks are made of wood can be used for storage are buildings 
bright pink shirts are made of cotton are made for wearing are clothing 
short skyscrapers are made of concrete have at least one entrance are buildings 
handmade sofas are comfortable are found in living rooms are furniture 
Korean squirrels eat nuts have bushy tails are rodents 
short-legged storks are black and white have had mothers are birds 
purple strawberries can be eaten have seeds are fruit 
8-wheeled wagons can be loaded are used for carrying things are vehicles 
speckled zebras are fast are warm blooded are mammals 
 
C) Examples of wiki-stories used in Experiment 6. (These were presented without the initial modifier-noun phrase, which is included for 
information). 
Speckled Catfish: Catfish have deeply forked tails. When small, their smooth-skinned bodies are usually speckled; however, these spots 
can disappear in older exemplars. They have a small dorsal fin with stiff spine standing high on their back. 
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Antique Rifles: A rifle is designed to be fired from the shoulder, with a barrel that has a helical groove or pattern of grooves ("rifling") 
cut into the barrel walls. The origins of rifling are difficult to trace, but some of the more antique rifles seem to have occurred in Europe 
during the fifteenth century.  
Opulent Shacks: In Australia, particularly in Tasmania, shacks were originally located on crown land such as along river banks. They 
were roughly built with no legal title on the land they were located on. Now, there are quite grand and opulent shacks often used during 
the summer season.  
Solitary Penguins: Penguins in New Zealand inhabit coastal forests and neighboring southern islands. Unique in appearance and 
behavior, these solitary creatures have experienced population decline in the last 50 years due to habitat loss and predation by introduced 
species.  
Baltic seaweed: German marine biologists are doing their bit to improve Germany's culinary reputation with a campaign to get Baltic 
seaweed recognized as a delicacy. A seaweed wine is already retailing at 22,50 euros ($28) a bottle.  
Hairless Hamsters: Hamsters are stout-bodied creatures, with tails much shorter than body length and have small ears, short stocky legs, 
and wide feet. They vary in color from white to shades of gray and black; they can even be hairless. 
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Figures 
Fig 1. The Effect of an Atypical Modifier on Rated Likelihood of Central and Mutable Sentences in 
Experiment 2. 
Fig 2. The Effect of an Atypical Modifier on Rated Likelihood of Category, Central and Mutable 
Sentences in Experiment 3b.  
Fig 3. The Effect of an Atypical Modifier on Rated Likelihood of Category, Central and Mutable 
Sentences based on Categorical Response Scales in Experiment 4  
Fig 4. The Effect of an Atypical Modifier on Rated Likelihood of Category and Mutable Sentences in 
Experiment 5. Left and Right Panels Show Different Orders of  Rating the Modified and Unmodified 
Sentences 
Fig 5. The Effect of an Atypical Modifier on Rated Likelihood of Category and Mutable Sentences in 
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